The Investment Scientist

Posts Tagged ‘yale endowment

“They are the cancer of the institutional investment world.” – David Swensen

Would you consider forming a partnership with someone you don’t know, in which you would contribute the money and that someone would conduct a business that you don’t understand, and do the accounting as well?

Most business owners would respond with a resounding “No!” The reason is obvious: such an arrangement is the surest way to lose money.

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University endowments are important institutions. They play a critical role in maintaining the academic excellence of the universities that rely heavily on their income. Recently, these endowments have drawn much attention because of their superior investment returns compared to other institution investors, such as investment banks and insurance companies.

There is much diversity among university endowments. Ivy League endowments such as those of Yale and Harvard are well ahead of the pack in terms of investment returns.

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The financial crisis has sparked a debate about the Yale model, that it doesn’t work as advertised in the current market condition. Here is David Swensen‘s response in an interview with Seth Hettena, Special to ProPublica.

The first thing I’d say is it’s too short a time period over which to judge. If you want to have a fair assessment of any investment strategy, get through the crisis and then look back and see how things performed.

If you look back 10 years from June 30, 2008, Yale’s performance was 16.3 percent per annum. Bonds were 5 percent plus or minus, and stocks were 3 percent plus or minus. So what are you going to do? You’re going to give up that kind of performance to hold a lot of bonds to protect against the financial crisis? Where’s the alternative that performs so much better? 100 percent government bonds? Is that the alternative? Well, then what would have happened if you had held that the decade before? I don’t get it.

They’re not thinking about what happened the 10 years before and they’re not giving us time to get through this crisis and see how it plays out for the Yale model against a more traditional portfolio. That’s one of the really interesting things in these articles that have been critical of the Yale model and sometimes of me personally: Where’s the alternative? What’s the option? Yeah, the model fails. Well, relative to what?

Here is the source.

Once upon a time, the Yale University Endowment invested like the rest of us, in just two asset classes: US equity and fixed income. After taking over the reins in 1987, David Swensen, the chief investment officer of Yale Endowment, moved aggressively into non-traditional and often illiquid asset classes like foreign equity, absolute return, real assets and private equity.

Chart: The Yale Model asset allocation
[enable picture display to see this chart]
Picture credit: thedividendguyblog.com

His unconventional approach produced a 20-year unbroken record of positive returns, resulting in stellar growth of the endowment from $1b to $17b. No wonder rival school Harvard University studies him closely. Other institutional money managers trip over themselves trying to mimic him.

Yale’s six asset classes are defined by their different expected response to economic conditions, such as inflation, growth and interest rate. Here is my own simplified explanation and cautionary note about these asset classes in relation to us as individual investors.

Absolute Return is a class of investment that seeks to generate long-term returns not correlated with the market.It does this by exploiting market inefficiencies. There are two basic strategies: event-driven and value driven. Event driven strategies rely on specific corporate events such as mergers, spin-offs or bankruptcy restructuring. Value driven strategies rely on buying under-valued assets while at the same time short-selling over-value assets. Don’t try this at home! You might just be the inefficiency being exploited.

Private Equity is a class of investment that participates in leverage-buyout (“LBO”) and venture capital. Venture capital is money that funded Google. However, it also funded thousands of failed ventures. LBO partnerships engage in the exercise of buying badly run businesses, reforming them, and then reselling them for a profit. Good private equity funds are generally close to individual investors. However, many below-average funds (often with exorbitant fees) are being aggressively marketed by Merrill Lynch and the like to unsuspecting high-net-worth individuals.

Real Assets include real estate and commodities. They are tangible (as opposed to paper assets) and they’re a good hedge to inflationary forces. This asset class is accessible to individual investors through Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and physical property such as the houses they live in.

Fixed Income is an asset class that produces a stable flow of income. It provides greater certainty than other asset classes. Fixed-income investments will perform badly in an inflationary environment, with the exception of treasury inflation protected bonds or TIPS. This asset class is readily accessible to individual investors.

Foreign Equity includes both matured market equity and emerging market equity. With US economy becoming an ever smaller slice of the global pie. This asset class provides a great way to participate in foreign growth. However, their diversification benefit is over-rated. With the exception of China, foreign stock markets highly correlate with the US market. Foreign equity is very accessible to individual investors.

Domestic Equity needs no additional explanation.

By all mean let David Swensen enlighten you, but don’t fall all over yourself trying to mimic him. What is good for Yale is not necessarily good for you. This is an advice coming from none other than Swensen himself.

Many investors are puzzled by the underperformance of small cap value since May of this year. They ask: “Is it worth being in an asset class that can’t do well in bad times?

To answer their question, I did a 10-year rolling return comparison between the Fama/French Small Cap Value (SCV) and the S&P 500 index using data from 1931 to 2010. The first 10-year period is 1931 to 1940, the second is 1932 to 1941, and the last is 2001 to 2010. Here is the rolling return chart I got.

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David Swensen discusses the current state of the market and derivative trading >>>

Yale’s Swensen sees “Extraordinary” opportunity to snap up debts >>>

David Swensen discusses the ups and downs of Yale Endowment >>>

Jack Bogle, father of index funds, likes David Swensen and Warren Buffet >>>

Boston Globe: “Harvard’s endowment plunges $8 billion

WSJ: “Harvard hit by loss as crisis spreads to college

Harvard Crimson: “Yale losses a quarter of its endowment

Edward Eptein in The Huffington Post argues in “How much has Harvard really lost?” that Harvard endowment loss could be a lot higher than disclosed.

Check out how Harvard and Yale endowments performed prior to this fiscal year here. Note their fiscal year ends in June 30th.

In a recent ABC news piece, Dr. David Swensen, manager of $34 billion Yale Endowment had this to say about Jim Cramer:

On ‘Mad Money,’ Cramer promotes a mindless short-term approach to markets by encouraging frenetic trading of individual stocks. Such a high-cost, tax-inefficient strategy almost guarantees failure.

In the same article, my view on Jim Cramer was also mentioned:

Zhuang is no fan of Cramer. Like Swensen and Ehrenberg, he argues against frequent trades and says Cramer may be influencing investors to overreact to financial news.

(For Swensen’s stellar track record, click here.)

This post was written at the depth of the financial crisis. If you stuck to the Swensen Model through out the crisis, you would be ahead now. See our model portfolio.

– Michael Zhuang

Wall Street Journal headline: “Harvard Endowment Returned 8.6%”

In light of the events of the last few weeks when financial companies collapsed in rapid succession, an all-weather portfolio is what all of us need. Yale and Harvard University endowments have portfolios that do well in both good and bad times. You’d expect these smart people to know what they are doing. They do!

In any one fiscal year (ending in June) since 2000, The Yale Endowment has never had a loss. Don’t you wish you had a portfolio that could do so well? Sadly, your record is likely to be worse than that of S&P 500. Harvard’s endowment portfolio had only two years with small losses. The worst was in 2001. That was when it suffered a loss of 2.7%. Here are the details:

Table 1: Comparison of returns for Yale, Harvard, and the S&P 500

    Year Economic Cycle Yale Harvard S&P 500
    2000 Tech bubble 41% 32% 7%
    2001 Tech bubble bust 9.2% -2.7% -14.83%
    2002 Tech bubble bust 0.7% -0.5% -17.99%
    2003 8.8% 12.5% 0.25%
    2004 19.4% 21.1% 19.11%
    2005 RE bubble 22.3% 19.2% 6.32%
    2006 RE bubble 22.9% 16.7% 8.63%
    2007 RE bubble bust 28% 23% 21%
    2008 RE bubble bust 4% 8.6% -14.8%
    Average Return 17.8% 14.4% 1.6%
    Volatility 12.4% 11.3% 14.6%

How did Yale and Harvard achieve such return stability through two major cycles of boom and bust?

The answer lies in their unconventional asset allocation. The typical US investor allocates 60% to domestic equity, primarily in large-cap growth stocks, and 40% to fixed income assets. In contrast, the endowments allocate to six non-cash asset classes that have low correlation with each other. In particular, domestic equity and fixed income make up only a small percentage of the overall portfolio: see Table 2 below. This broad diversification across weakly correlated asset classes is the primary reason why the endowment portfolios did well in both boom and bust times. (I will discuss secondary reasons in the future.)

Table 2: Asset allocations of Yale and Harvard endowments

Asset Classes Domestic Equity Absolute Return Foreign Equity Private Equity Real Assets Fixed Income Cash
Yale 11% 23.3% 14.1% 18.7% 27.1% 4% 1.9%
Harvard 12% 18% 22.% 11% 26% 16% -5%

Both endowments allocate over 25% to real assets, such as real estate and basic materials. This allocation seeks to protect against the double threat of a weak dollar and inflation.

Chart: Evolution of Yale Endowment asset allocation

As the chart above shows, Yale Endowment significantly increased its exposure to real assets in the last three years. Average investors like you and me would be well-served to heed the unspoken message of these intelligently-managed endowments. And now for your take-home lesson:

1. Broadly diversify

2. Hedge against inflation and the weak dollar.

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Author

Michael Zhuang is principal of MZ Capital, a fee-only independent advisory firm based in Washington, DC.

Twitter: @mzhuang

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